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STUDENT LOAN BANKRUPTCIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of student loans discharged in bankruptcy has grown
rapidly in the past few years. In 1975 alone there were 4,559 claims,
representing a 59.9% increase over the number of claims filed in 1974.1
By the end of 1975 the federal government and guaranty agencies had
reimbursed lenders for $20.9 million of guaranteed student loans dis-
charged in bankruptcy.2 Of the $18.5 million paid by the federal gov-
ernment, $14.1 million was paid from January 1974 through June
1976.3
These figures have provoked several recent judicial4 and legislative
responses.' A provision of the Education Amendments of 19766 pro-
hibits the discharge of a guaranteed student loan in the first five years
of its repayment period unless the debtor can prove undue hardship.
Bills currently before Congress,7 however, would repeal this provision
and allow guaranteed student loans to be freely dischargeable again.
This Note, in suggesting an appropriate solution to the problem, exam-
ines: (1) possible legislative solutions to the problem of student loan
bankruptcies, (2) the policies behind the educational loan programs
and the Bankruptcy Act, (3) the available statistics on student loans
and defaults, (4) the congressional hearings and reports, and (5) the
judicial responses. It concludes that all guaranteed student loans and
National Direct Students Loans should be excepted by statute from dis-
charge during the first five years of the repayment period if the creditor
1. Bankruptcy Act Reviion.: Hearings on H..31 and 32 Before the Subcomnt on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 1065, 1076
(1975-1976) (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act Hearings].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977); Handsome v. Rutgers Univ.,
445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.NJ. 1978); State v. Wilkes, 41 N.Y.2d 655, 363 N.E.2d 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d
849 (1977).
5. Education Amendments of 1976, § 127(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976); H.R. 8457, 95th
Cong., 1st Ses. (1977); H.R. 8200,95th Cong., Ist Ses. (1977); H.R. 31 & 32,94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 4-506(a)(8) (1976).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976).
7. H.R. 8457, 95th Cong., Ist Ses. (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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can prove that the debtor will not suffer undue hardship if required to
repay the loan. A proviso to the statute should prohibit educational
institutions from engaging in coercive repayment practices after a stu-
dent loan is discharged in bankruptcy.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Two major loan programs currently provide funds to students for
educational expenses. The National Defense Education Act estab-
lished a program in 1958 to provide National Defense Student Loans
(NDSL) to students in institutions of higher learning. 8 Under this pro-
gram a student borrows directly from an institution's loan fund, which
is supported by federal and institutional contributions.9
In 1965 Congress provided a federal guaranteed student loan pro-
gram (GSL) and enacted provisions encouraging state and private
guaranteed student loan programs. 10 Under a GSL program a student
borrows money from a bank, corporation, college, or any other qualify-
ing lender. The guaranty agency, which could be the federal govern-
ment, a state agency, or a private nonprofit organization, endorses the
loan." There are state or nonprofit guarantors in twenty-six states;
most are reinsured by the Commissioner of Education.12
Both programs provide for the cancellation of loans upon the death
or disability of the borrower. 13 In addition, a specified percentage of
8. National Defense Education Act, § 201, 20 U.S.C. § 421 (1976). Congress continued the
basic program under § 461(a) of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa (1976),
but changed the name of the loans to National Direct Student Loans.
9. The Commissioner of Education apportions the funds authorized for student loans
among the states; each institution applies to the Commissioner for a portion of the funds allocated
to the state in which it is located. The institution then sets up a fund to which it contributes one
dollar for every nine dollars the federal government contributes. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087bb-cc (1976).
10. Higher Education Act of 1965, § 421, 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976).
11. The guaranty agency promises repayment of the principal and interest to the lender.
The lender also receives a special allowance of up to three percent interest from the federal gov-
ernment to encourage participation. S. REP. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws. 4713, 4730; see UNITED STUDENT AID FUNDS, INC., INFORMIA-
TION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDENT LOAN APPLICANTS (June 1977).
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. is presently the only nonprofit student loan organization oper-
ating nationwide. Review of Higher Education Programs, 1975: Hearings on Examination into the
High Default Rate and the New Policy of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare In
Regard to Rfnds Due Students Attending Schools and How .hose Refunds Affect the Amount of
Federal Guarantee Before the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm on Labor and Public
Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 188 (1975) (statement of Charles Meares) [hereinafter cited as
Hi'gher Education Hearings].
12. See Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1076.
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087(a), 1087dd(c)(1)(F) (1976). When an NDSL is cancelled the institu-
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an NDSL may be cancelled for each year that a student performs cer-
tain public services such as full-time teaching of handicapped children
in a public elementary school.'4 If a student defaults on a loan or is
discharged in bankruptcy, the loss falls primarily on the federal
government.1 5
The purposes of the student loan programs are: (1) to ensure a suffi-
cient supply of well-trained, competent professional and technical per-
sonnel;'6 and (2) to allow every person the fullest possible educational
opportunity by making loans available to those who could not other-
wise obtain a loan because of their age and lack of collateral or borrow-
tion bears 10% of the loss and the federal government bears the remainder. When a GSL is
cancelled, the Commissioner pays the outstanding balance to the lender, the federal government,
therefore, bears the entire loss. 45 C.F.R. § 177.5 (1977).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee (1976). The Commissioner repays the entire amount cancelled to the
institution's loan fund.
15. When an NDSL has been in default for at least two years, the institution may assign its
rights without recompense to the United States. 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(a)(5) (1976). The institution
loses 10% of the amount of the loan, while the federal government loses 90%. Any portion of the
loan collected after assignment is assigned to the general Treasury fund. Id. The purpose of this
provision is to allow the institutions and the Office of Education to clear their books of uncollecti-
ble loans. H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 2462, 2493.
When a student borrower defaults on a GSL the guarantor repays the lender. If the loan is
federally guaranteed, the Commissioner, upon notification by the lender, will repay the "amount
of the loss." 20 U.S.C. § 1080(a) (1976). The "amount of the loss" will be 100% of the unpaid
principal plus interest, unless more than 5% of the loans made by the lender that were in repay-
ment at the end of the preceding fiscal year are in default. In that case the lender is entitled to
only 90% of the loss on those loans in excess of 5% of the total loans and 80% of the loss on those
loans in excess of 9% of the total loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1075(b)(1)(A) (1976). The statute also pro-
vides that if a student loan is discharged in bankruptcy, the Commissioner will repay the out-
standing balance. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(b) (1976). If the defaulted loan is insured by a state or
nonprofit guaranty organization and the organization is reinsured by the federal government, the
organization pays the lender its loss and is then reimbursed by the federal government. It will be
reimbursed in full if the organization's total default rate is less than or equal to 5%. If more than
5% of the agency's loans are in default, the agency will be reimbursed for 90% of the excess loans
and, if more than 9% of the agency's loans are in default, the agency will be reimbursed for 80% of
the excess. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(1)(B) (1976). These reimbursement provisions also apply when a
student loan is discharged in bankruptcy. After the federal government pays a claim or reim-
burses a guaranty organization, the Office of Education has the responsibility to attempt to collect
from the student. Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1076.
16. 20 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 144.1 (1977). "If there is any one thing upon which
all commentators in the field agree it is that the explanation for the enactment of NDEA can be
summed up in one word, Sputnik." Garsaud, The National Defense Education Act, Title
ll-Student Loan Program--Moving Toward the End of the First Decade, 14 Loy. L. REv. 79, 82
(1967). It was also a factor leading to the enactment of the guaranteed student loan programs.
See S. REP. No. 673, 89th Cong., Ist Ses., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4027, 4053.
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ing history. 17
The present Bankruptcy Act represents a fusion of two contradictory
notions: retaliation and cooperative action. 8 The retaliatory notion-
that "persons who fail to pay their debts ought to be punished"-
comes from Roman law.' 9 Every state now bans imprisonment for
debt 20 however the correspondence received by the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States "suggests that the attitudes that
animated the builders of debtors' prison still survive."2'
The premise of cooperative action is that society should maximize
both the return to creditors and the rehabilitation of debtors. The
original emphasis was on the equitable adjustment of creditors'
claims. 22 As society recognized the social costs of permanent financial
distress, a concern evolved for the welfare of debtors.23 Today the pri-
mary purpose of bankruptcy is the discharge of indebtedness and the
"fresh start" that follows.24
Discharge is a privilege available to the "honest but unfortunate
debtor" to give him a "fresh start,. . . a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discour-
agement of preexisting debt."'  A debtor is considered honest if he has
17. See S. REP. No. 673, supra note 16, at 4060; Higher Education Hearings, supra note 11, at
182 (statement of B.B. Elkins).
18. H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 61, 63 (1973).
19. Kennedy, Relections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtorr' Fresh
Start, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 427, 428 (1974). The first federal Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 6th
Cong., Ist Sess., 2 Stat. 19, followed English bankruptcy practice, which had its origins in Roman
law. See Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226, 228 (1976).
20. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 431.
21. Id. at 431-32.
22. See IA COLLIER ON BANKRuvrcY 9 14.01 (14th ed. 1978); Note, Section 14f(2) ofthe
Bankrp tcyact: Haft Loafto the Bankrupt, 14 Hous. L. REv. 486, 487-88 (1977). See also In re
Leslie, 119 F. 406 (N.D.N.Y. 1903).
23. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: State Law or FederalaPolcy?, 35 U. PITr. L. REv. 630
(1974). "[A] discharge provides him with the incentive to use his skills and talents, and thereby
contribute to society even after financial disaster." IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 114.01 (14th
ed. 1978).
24. See IA COLLIER ON BtANIPTCy 9 14.01 (14th ed. 1978). From fiscal year 1946
through fiscal year 1967 approximately 90% of bankruptcy cases involved nonbusiness debtors.
See Countryman, supra note 19, at 231. Of these, about 85% were no-asset cases, in which no
dividends were distributed to creditors; yet in over 95% of the cases courts granted a discharge.
See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 435-36. The emphasis on discharge is also apparent in judicial
decisions. See, e.g., Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19-20 (1971); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938); Freshman v. Atkins, 269 U,S. 121, 122-23 (1925).
25. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934).
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not committed any of the acts listed in section 14(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act,26 which a creditor can use as the basis for an objection to a
discharge.27
Although the fresh start doctrine is recognized by many courts28 and
by Congress,29 some cases limit it. For example, in Wemore v.
26. The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has (1) commit-
ted an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided under section 152 of title 18; or
(2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to keep or preserve books of ac-
count or records, from which his financial condition and business transactions might be
ascertained, unless the court deems such acts or failure to have been justified under all
the circumstances of the case; or (3) while engaged in business as a sole proprietor, part-
nership, or as an executive of a corporation, obtained for such business money or prop-
erty on credit or as an extension or renewal of credit by making or publishing or causing
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever a materially false statement in writ-
ing respecting his financial condition or the financial condition of such partnership or
corporation; or (4) at any time subsequent to the first day of the twelve months immedi-
ately preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed,
or concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his property
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; or (5) in a proceeding under this
title commenced within six years prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy has been granted a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of
composition or a wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed under this title; or
(6) in the course of a proceeding under this title refused to obey any lawful order of, or to
answer any material question approved by, the court; or (7) has failed to explain satisfac-
torily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities; or (8) has failed to
pay the filing fees required to be paid by this title in full: Provided, That if, upon the
hearing of an objection to a discharge, the objector shall show to the satisfaction of the
court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt has committed
any of the acts which, under this subdivision, would prevent his discharge in bankruptcy,
then the burden of proving that he has not committed any of such acts shall be upon the
bankrupt.
11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1976).
27. See generally IA COLLIER ON BAKRnPrcY 14.02(1) (14th ed. 1978); Schuchman, An
Attempt at a "'Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 403, 449-50 (1973). The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 read in pertinent part: "The judge shall... investigate the merits of the
application and discharge the applicant unless he has [committed objectionable acts]." Ch. 541, §
14, 30 Stat. 550 (1898) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976)). Section 14(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act now provides in pertinent part: "The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the
bankrupt has [committed objectionable acts]." The merits of the application, therefore, are not to
be investigated any further than the eight statutory grounds of objection. IA COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPrCY 14.02(1) (14th ed. 1978).
28. See, ag., Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970), in which the Court stated that the "most
important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition of 'property' lies in the basic pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the debtor a 'new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort,'" and held therefore that a bankrupt wage earner's vacation pay did not pass to the trustee
in bankruptcy as "property." Accord, In re Schmelzer, 480 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973); In re Aveni,
458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1972).
29. The 1966 amendments to § 17(aX1) of the Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 2, 80
Stat. 220 (current version at II U.S.C. § 35 (1976)), made debts for taxes, which became legally
due and owing more than three years preceding bankruptcy, dischargeable. The House Report
explaining the amendment reflects Congress' concern for the "honest but financially unfortunate
debtor" unable to make a fresh start due to "an overwhelming liability for accumulated taxes."Washington University Open Scholarship
598 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Markoe,3 ° the Supreme Court refused to allow the debtor's need for a
fresh start to override his moral and legal obligation to support his wife
and children. And in In re Kokoszka, the Second Circuit held that
"permitting a bankrupt to retain his tax refund would not be giving
him a 'fresh start' to accumulate new wealth, but [rather] a 'head start'
over others who had no such refund. '31
III. THE PROBLEM AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
The federal government extends loans to students with neither collat-
eral nor a cosignor.32 If a student defaults on his loan or declares
bankruptcy, the government has no property or guarantor to look to for
satisfaction of the indebtedness. Because of the Bankruptcy Act's defi-
nition of insolvency,33 any student whose total liabilities exceed his to-
tal assets may declare bankruptcy and thereby relieve himself of his
student loan obligation. Until recently, however, students used the
Bankruptcy Act too infrequently to arouse concern. From 1966, when
the GSL program began, through 1970, there were only 348 GSL bank-
ruptcy claims, totaling $0.4 million.3 4 By the end of 1975 the federal
government and guaranty agencies had paid approximately $21 million
in bankruptcy claims. 35 From 1970 through 1975 approximately $9
million in NDSLs were discharged in bankruptcy.36 In fiscal year 1975
S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2468,
2469.
30. 196 U.S. 68 (1904). Despite the Court's refusal to relieve this debtor of his obligation,
Wetmore was one of the first cases to recognize the fresh start doctrine. Id. at 77.
31. 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973), a.ff'd sub nom. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642
(1974). Accord, Richardson v. United States, 552 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1077(a)(2)(A), 1087(c)(1)(E) (1976).
33. A person shall be deemed insolveht within the provisions of this tide whenever the
aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, trans-
ferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to de-
fraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount
to pay his debts ....
11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
34. See Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1076.
35. See 1. Other figures show that approximately $18 million of bankruptcy claims were
paid by the end of 1975. Id. at 1085. Of this approximately $11 million was paid under the
federally insured loan program and $7 million under state and private guaranty agency programs,
Id. at 1084. Bankruptcies represent 4% of the total loss under the entire GSL program (loss
results from default, bankruptcy, death, or disability) and 0.5% of the cumulative matured amount
of GSLs. .d. at 1085.
36. Letter from Robert Coates, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1977) (statistics on NDSL program (available on request from
the Law Quartery)). By 1975 the GSL program had disbursed almost three times the dollar
amount of loans disbursed under the NDSL program. From 1970 through 1975 both programs
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alone $6.8 million in GSLs37 and $3.3 million in NDSLs 38 were dis-
charged in bankruptcy. The incidence of GSL bankruptcies has grown
at a much greater rate than individual or nonbusiness bankruptcies39
and is expected to continue to increase as a result of the more aggres-
sive collection activities recently initiated by the federal government. 40
To explore the increased use of the bankruptcy process by former
students, two congressional hearings were held in 1975 and early
1976.41 Unfortunately, no documented studies of the reasons for the
increase were submitted to either hearing.42 Instead, most of the state-
ments assumed that the increase was attributable to abuse of the bank-
ruptcy process.43  The term "abuse" refers to situations where a
student has income or a strong possibility of receiving income, but files
for bankruptcy to avoid repayment of his student loan.44 Witnesses
experienced approximately the same rate of loss on loans discharged in bankruptcy. Id; Bank-
ruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1085.
37. Letter from Robert Coates, supra note 36. From fiscal 1966 through fiscal 1972 the
number of federally insured student loan bankruptcies totaled 2,146 for $2.4 million; in February
1975 the cumulative total reached 8,969 for $11.3 million. Higher Education Hearings, supra note
11, at 6 (statement of T.H. Bell).
38. Letter from Robert Coates, supra note 36.
39. "From fiscal year 1973 to fiscal year 1974 the number of guaranteed student bankruptcies
increased 29.2%. The national average of the number of individual bankruptcies increased 8.4%
during the same period. ... From fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 1975 the number of student
loan bankruptcies jumped 59.9% while the national average of the number of bankruptcies moved
upward 32.9%." Banktuptcy Act Hearings, supra note I, at 1078. From 1973 to 1974 the dollar
amount of discharged NDSLs increased 14.3% and from 1974 to 1975 there was an increase of
82.1%. Letter from Robert Coates, supra note 36.
40. Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1069, 1077. By 1975 GSLs in default totaled
$401 million. Id. at 1085. As collection efforts are increased, it is likely that many debtors whose
loans are in default will seek a bankruptcy discharge. September 1975 statistics showed that the
25% rate of bankruptcy losses in Wisconsin was much higher than other states. A witness sug-
geated this was attributable to the "vigorous pursuit of defaulters" in Wisconsin. Id. at 1091
(statement of John N. Erlenborn).
41. Higher Education Hearings, spra note 11; Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1.
42. See Higher Education Hearing, supra note 11; Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1.
43. There were only two attempts during the hearings to statistically substantiate this as-
sumption. Charles Meares, president of United Student Aid Funds, Inc., said that 85% of USAF
defaulters who declare bankruptcy do so within three years of leaving school and that in many
cases student loans represented 90% of a bankrupt's liabilities (60% to 70% being commonplace).
Higher Education Hearings, supra note 11, at 189. In addition, another witness testified that the
results of a 1975 survey under the New Jersey state guarantee program revealed the average time
between the receipt of the last loan and the filing of bankruptcy was two and a half years, while a
survey conducted in 1972 showed four and a half years as the average. Furthermore, the occupa-
tions of those borrowers who had declared bankruptcy included an assistant dean of students, a
vice principal, a teacher, and a pharmacist. BankruptcyAct Hearings, supra note 1, at 1079 (state-
ment of Edward T. York, Jr.).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977) (married defendants with
a combined salary of $20,000 and outstanding student loans of $18,300 filed for bankruptcy).Washington University Open Scholarship
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suggested other reasons for the increase in student loan bankruptcies:
(1) students leaving college today are entering the worst economic situ-
ation since the Depression and are finding work unavailable or avail-
able only at subsistence wages;45 and (2) bankruptcy is merely
"symptomatic of the general permissiveness" of the GSL program.46
The period from 1975 through most of 1977 was marked by public
alarm over the increasing number of student loan bankruptcies and by
the assumption that the increase was attributable to abuse of the bank-
ruptcy process.47 In response, Congress enacted section 127(a) of the
Education Amendments of 1976, which reads:
A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the authority of this
part may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy
Act only if such discharge is granted after the five-year period (exclusive
of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) beginning on the
date of commencement of the repayment period of such loan, except that
prior to the expiration of that five-year period, such loan may be released
only if the court in which the proceeding is pending determines that pay-
ment from future income or other wealth will impose an undue hardship
on the debtor or his dependents.4 8
Also in 1976 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States proposed an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act that would have
One witness questioned the validity of this assumption:
I would like to point out that none of the witnesses has given us a documentation to
support the allegations made that there is a general attitude of "I am not going to pay my
bills, and I am going to take advantage of the bankruptcy laws." We had an increase of
bankruptcy in this country generally, that is very large in the last few years. A lot of it
has to do with recession and a lot with inflation and all kinds of different things.
.8ankruptcy Act Hearings, suara note 1, at 1096 (statement of Rep. Edwards).
45. Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note I, at 1083, 1129 (statements of Rep, Edwards, Cla-
rissa Gilbert).
46. Higher Education Hearings, supra note 11, at 64. The Consumer Bankers Association
asserted that "[w]ith more explicit instructions to students, better defined eligibility requirements,
and stronger collection effort, perhaps we could restore enough discipline in this program to avoid
the question of providing the U.S. Government with an additional priority." Id. The high de-
fault rate and total amount of unpaid GSLs indicate the ineffectiveness of the program's collection
system. The default rate on federally insured student loans is approximately 18-22%, on state
guaranteed loans, approximately 7.6%, and on USAF loans, about 6%. The national average
default rate on unsecured revolving consumer credit is about 5.4%. See Higher Education Hear.
ings, supra note 11, at 51, 188 (statements of Charles M. Meares, Robert E. Tobey); Bankruptcy
Act Hearings, supra note I, at 1090 (statement of John N. Erlenborn).
47. See Higher Education Hearings, supra note 11, at 187-90; Bankruptcy Acl Hearings, supra
note 1, at 1066, 1078-79, 1091, 1093, 1101-03, 1121-22.
48. Education Amendments of 1976, § 127(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976) (amending
Higher Education Act of 1965, § 439(a), 20 U.S.C. 1087-3 (1976)). Subsection (b) provides that
subsection (a) is effective "with respect to any proceedings begun under the Bankruptcy Act on or
before September 30, 1977." Id.
"mTlhis part" refers to "Part B. Federal, State, and Private Programs of Low-Interest Insured
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excepted from discharge "any educational debt if the first payment of
any installment thereof was due on a date less than five years prior to
the date of the petition and if its payment from future income or other
wealth will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his depen-
dents."49 There are two major differences between these responses.
First, section 127(a) of the Education Amendments of 1976 applies only
to GSLs,5° whereas the proposed Bankruptcy Act amendment would
have excepted from discharge both GSLs and NDSLs. Second, under
the Education Amendment the burden of proving the existence of un-
due hardship rests on the debtor,5" whereas the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion's proposed amendment would have required the creditor to prove
that a denial of discharge would not result in undue hardship. 2
Loans to Students in Institutions of Higher Education," which is a section of the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1071-87-4 (1976). As a result, this section limits only the discharge of
GSLs and not NDSLs.
The Senate Report indicates that Congress enacted the nondischarge provision because of the
rapid increase in the number and amount of guaranteed student loans discharged in bankruptcy.
S. REP. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 32-33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4713, 4713, 4744. The belief that the increase was due to abuse cases and that it threatened to
destroy the entire guaranteed loan system pervaded both congressional hearings. See, e.g., Higher
Education Hearings, supra note 11, at 6, 191; Bankruptcy Act Hearings supra note 1, at 1067-68,
1078-79, 1090.
49. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4-506(a)(8) (1976), reprinted in Bankruptcy Act Hearings,
.upra note I, app. 156-57. The Commission made the same proposal in 1973. H.R. 6, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 4-506(aX8) (1973). The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges proposed similar
amendments in 1973 and 1976. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4-506(a)(8) (1976); H.R. 7, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-506(a)(8) (1973).
50. During both the Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, and the Higher Education Hear-
ings, supra note 11, witnesses showed concern only for the GSL program. For example:
I would not be uncomfortable if the definition of educational debt were to be limited to
Federal and Federal insured or guaranteed student loans. This construction would
cover the major Federal student loan effort and secure, I believe, the concerns of the
overwhelming majority of those actively involved with the problem.
Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1091-92 (statement of John N. Erlenborn). The GSL
program is the largest single form of student aid authorized by the Committee on Education and
Welfare. Id. at 1090. As of June 30, 1976, the cumulative number of GSLs was 8,210,000 and
cumulative loan volume was $8.2 billion. S. REP. No. 882, supra note 48, at 4730-31.
51. To prevent discharge of the loan, the creditor must prove that the loan is a GSL and that
the first five years of the repayment period have not expired. To secure discharge of the loan, the
debtor must show that he will suffer undue hardship if forced to repay the loan. Compare Educa-
tion Amendments of 1976, § 127(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976), with Bankruptcy Act, § 17(a)(3),
11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(3) (1976). The Supreme Court interpreted § 17(a)(3) as requiring a creditor, in
order to prevent discharge of his claim, to prove that the debt owed him was not "duly scheduled
in time for proof and allowance," and requiring a debtor, in order to secure discharge of the debt,
to prove that the creditor "had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy."
Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 595 (1923).
52. To prevent discharge of the loan, the creditor must show that the loan is an "educational
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In 1977 a General Accounting Office (GAO) study53 revealed the
presence of abuse in approximately twenty percent of the prior year's
bankruptcy cases involving GSLs. This study54 and a reevaluation of
the default and bankruptcy figures convinced many that excepting edu-
cational loans from discharge was not justified by need or sound
policy.55
In July 1977 a bill56 was introduced in the House that would make
all student loans dischargeable in bankruptcy. In 1978 the House
passed Bankruptcy Act amendments57 that would not include educa-
tional debts among the exceptions from discharge and would provide
for repeal of the Education Amendment provision that now limits the
discharge of guaranteed student loans. 58
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOANS
There have been three recent judicial responses to the increasing
numbers of student loan bankruptcies. In State v. Wilkes, 9 the New
York Court of Appeals failed to recognize or discuss abuse, although
its clear presence may have influenced the decision. The court's hold-
ing-NDSLs were too contingent to be dischargeable in bank-
debt," that the first five years of the repayment period have not expired prior to the date of the
debtor's petition, and that repayment of the debt will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor.
H.R. 31, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4-506(a)(8) (1975), refprinted in Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra
note 1, app. 157.
53. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 140-44 (1977). The study revealed 72% of
the sample individuals, including teachers, housewives, students, mechanics, attorneys, carpenters,
and truck drivers, were employed at the time of filing their bankruptcy petitions. In the year prior
to filing for bankruptcy, 20% of the sample individuals had incomes in excess of $10,000, and
another 39% had incomes of $5,001 to $10,000. Educational debts accounted for 60% or more of
all nonpriority, unsecured indebtedness in 35% of the sample cases, and in 8% of the cases educa-
tional debts were the only debts listed. Id.
54. Id. at 133, 154-55, 161-62.
55. Id. at 132-64. The former Chairman of the Post-Secondary Education Subcommittee,
stated: "Mo assert that a practice involving less than one student borrower out of two hundred is
a 'large and growing scandal' seems a little disproportionate." Id. at 148 (statement of James
O'Hara), Some witnesses asserted that improvement of the administration of the loan programs
is a better solution, id. at 133, 151, 154, 160, and that the discharge exception "is a punitive meas-
ure which unfairly discriminates against every student who relies on loans to help pay the costs of
education." Id. at 149, 153, 160.
56. H.R. 8547, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
57. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
58. Id. Education Amendments of 1976, § 127(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976). See note
48 supra and accompanying text.
59. 41 N.Y.2d 655, 363 N.E.2d 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1977), rev'g 52 App. Div. 2d 454, 384
N.Y.S.2d 530 (1976). See note 75-77 infra and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/6
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ruptcy-will prevent all bankrupts, even those in real need of relief,
from obtaining a discharge of their NDSLs. In Girardier v. Webster
College,6' the Eighth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Act did not pro-
hibit coercive post-discharge debt collection attempts by aprivate col-
lege. But a federal district court, in Handsome v. Rutgers University,61
held that a state university may not withhold transcripts or deny regis-
tration to a former student whose student loans had been discharged.6 2
When defendant in Wilkes filed for bankruptcy 3 he was earning an
annual salary of $9,00014 and owed $3,900 for NDSLs,65 $3,000 for
loans guaranteed by the New York State Higher Education Assistance
Corporation,66 and $160 for various charge accounts 7.6  His petition
was granted, and when plaintiff brought an action to recover the
amount of the NDSL debt, Special Term granted summary judgment
to defendant on the basis of his former discharge.68 The Appellate Di-
vision affirmed,69 but the New York Court of Appeals reversed and
held that an NDSL is a contingent debt not capable of reasonable esti-
mation and therefore not a provable debt dischargeable in bank-
60. 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
61. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.NJ. 1978).
62. Although Rutgers was decided after the GAO study, the court still found there was
"widespread abuse of the bankruptcy laws on the part of students." Id. at 1363. Plaintiff, how-
ever, appears to have been in legitimate need of a discharge. She was compelled to leave school
because of medical problems and her NDSLs constituted only 20% of the liabilities she discharged
in bankruptcy. Id. at 1363-64.
63. 41 N.Y.2d at 657, 363 N.E.2d at 557, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
64. Id.
65. 52 App. Div. 2d at 455, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
66. Id.
67. 41 N.Y.2d at 657, 363 N.E.2d at 557, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
68. Id. at 656, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
69. 52 App. Div. 2d at 454,384 N.Y.S.2d at 530. The Appellate Division ruled that NDSLs
were provable in bankruptcy. Id. at 457, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 532. After examining §§ 63(a) and
57(d) of the Bankruptcy Act and pertinent law (Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 (1931), and In re
Crisp, 521 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975)), the court was "constrained to conclude that the liability on the
debts in question was fixed and existed at the time defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy." Id.
at 457, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
70. 41 N.Y.2d at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 851. The New York Court of
Appeals reasoned as follows: (1) only provable debts are dischargeable, Bankruptcy Act, § 17(a),
11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976); (2) in general, contingent debts may be proved and allowed, id. §
63(a)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(8) (1976); (3) if, however, a contingent claim is "not capable ... of
reasonable estimation," it shall not be allowed, id. § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1976); and (4) a
contingent claim that has been proved, but that has not been allowed "is deemed to be not prova-
ble." Id. § 63(d), 11 U.S.C. § 103(d) (1976). The court stated that because the claim was not
susceptible of "reasonable estimation," it would not have been allowed if the state had filed a
proof of claim and, therefore, it was not dischargeable when the court granted defendant's bank-
ruptcy petition. 41 N.Y.2d at 657-58, 363 N.E.2d at 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
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ruptcy.7° When Wilkes received his NDSL it was subject to several
conditions: cancellation in the event of the maker's total and perma-
nent disability or death; reduction of ten percent of the unpaid balance
for each year of service as a full-time public school teacher, up to a
maximum of fifty percent; and reduction of fifteen percent for each
year of teaching in specified low-income areas or of teaching the handi-
capped.71 The court reasoned that these conditions, taken together,
made the ultimate amount of liability impossible to ascertain or ap-
proximate.72 It further asserted that the vague provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act dealing with contingent claims73 should be construed to
achieve the Act's basic purpose, which was, according to the court, "to
relieve honest debtors of the crushing burdens of heavy debt," and not
to allow student borrowers to frustrate the purposes of the national stu-
dent loan program.74
The court's refusal to find NDSLs capable of reasonable estimation
is not supported by existing case law and the limited conditions placed
on these loans. The Bankruptcy Act provides that contingent debts
may be proved and allowed. An exception to this general rule arises
when any contingent debt is not allowed under section 57(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act76 because it is not capable of reasonable estimation.
The claim is then deemed unprovable. 7
Congress designed section 57(d) "to codify the judicially declared
state of the law prior to its enactment. '78  Thus to determine the scope
71. 41 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 363 N.E.2d at 557, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
72. Id. at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 851. The court also reasoned that the loan
was not a commercial transaction in which the state had weighed the benefits of having the stu-
dent borrower teach against the costs of nonrepayment. Consequently, "any attempt at valuing
the teaching obligation by reference to the amount of the loan is unavailing." Id. at 659, 363
N.E.2d at 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52.
73. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 57(d), 63(a)(8), 63(d), 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(d), 103(a)(8), 103(d) (1976).
74. 41 N.Y.2d at 660, 363 N.E.2d at 558-59, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
75. "Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are founded
upon ...contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities .... " Bankruptcy Act, §
63(a)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(8) (1976).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1976) provides:
Claims which have been duly proved shall be allowed upon receipt by or upon presen.
tation to the court... : Provided, however, That an unliquidated or contingent claim
shall not be allowed unless liquidated or the amount thereof estimated in the manner
and within the time directed by the court; and such claim shall not be allowed if the
court shall determine that it is not capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation or
that such liquidation or estimation would unduly delay the administration of the estate
or any proceeding under this title.
77. Id. § 63(d), 11 U.S.C. § 103(d) (1976).
78. Thompson v. England, 226 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1955).
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of "contingent debts" capable of reasonable estimation, it is necessary
to determine the state of the law in 1938. In Dunbar v. Dunbar,79 the
Supreme Court held that a husband's written contractual obligation to
pay his wife a specified sum annually "during her life or so long as she
remained unmarried" was incapable of valuation and therefore not
provable under the Bankruptcy Act. 0 The Court recognized that an
annuity terminating at death could easily be valued by reference to life
expectancy tables, but found the contingency of "continued widow-
hood" impossible to calculate.8 '
In Maynard v. Elliott, 2 considered the leading case in this area, 3 the
Supreme Court held that a claim against an indorser of unmatured
commercial paper was provable.8 4 The Court noted that the contin-
gent nature of an obligation rendered a claim upon it incapable of
proof when it is "beyond the control of the creditor, and dependent
upon an event so fortuitous as to make it uncertain liability will ever
attach.. . . [our the contingency may be such as to make any valua-
tion of the claim impossible, even though liability has attached. 8 s5
79. 190 U.S. 340 (1903).
80. Id. at 351.
81. Id. at 345.
82. 283 U.S. 273 (1931).
83. See, ag., Thompson v. England, 226 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1955); State v. Wilkes, 41
N.Y.2d 655, 658, 363 N.E.2d 555, 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (1977).
84. 283 U.S. at 275-76. The Court compared the claim against an indorser of commercial
paper to a claim on contracts of suretyship or on a guaranty of payment of a debt not due until
after bankruptcy. Id.
85. Id. at 278. Since Maynard, courts have viewed the question of estimation liberally to
afford the bankrupt a fresh start by including all his debts within the scope of the discharge. See,
,g., Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937); In re Crisp, 521 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975); Schaefer v.
Smith, 469 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1972); Chevron Oil Co. v. Dobie, 40 N.Y.2d 712,358 N.E.2d 502,
389 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1976); Edwards Co. v. Long Island Trust Co., 75 Misc. 2d 739, 347 N.Y.S.2d
898 (1973).
Where claimant loaned her husband, the bankrupt, $12,000 to be repaid from the proceeds of
his business "as soon as said business is in a sound, financial position," the claim was held to be
contingent on an event so "fortuitous as to make it uncertain liability will ever attach" and there-
fore not allowable. Thompson v. England, 226 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1955) (quoting Maynard v.
Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 278 (1931)). The claims of two persons who had purchased stock from a
bankrupt, under an agreement that the bankrupt would repurchase the stock for $5,500 if they had
not received a $5,000 return on the stock prior to specified dates in 1972, were allowable under the
bankrupt's petition filed in 1971. The court said that the amounts of both claims were fixed,
$5,500 each, therefore, no estimation was necessary and that the contingency was not dependent
on an event so fortuitous as to make it uncertain liability would ever attach. Schaefer v. Smith,
469 F.2d 1256, 1258 (10th Cir. 1972) (quoting Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 278 (1931)). A
state's claim against the bankrupt for hospitalization costs was capable of reasonable estimation
under § 57(d), though the debt was subject to possible increase in the future. In re Crisp, 521 F.2d
172, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1975). The bankrupt's liability already existed; therefore only the amount of
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The Court pointed to Dunbar86 as an example of the latter class.8 7 In
1937 the Supreme Court added its last thoughts on this subject: "What
infusion of contingency will vitiate a claim is at best a question of de-
gree,. . . though there is a leaning toward allowance in aid of the pur-
pose of the statute to relieve the honest debtor."88
Section 57(d) of the Bankruptcy Act89 expressly provides that estima-
tion need only be reasonable and recognizes that estimation should be
based on all the pertinent facts ascertainable at the time of liquida-
tion.90 For example, in the case of a guaranty, which becomes opera-
tive only upon the occurrence of an indefinite event such as the default
of the principal debtor, the financial status of the principal debtor
"should be carefully examined and his probable future revenue and
expenditure appraised as accurately as feasible, before determining
whether, and if so, to what extent the bankrupt guarantor may be
called upon to redeem his promise. This determination, however, calls
for an estimate." 9' If the claim against a guarantor92 or an indorser of
commercial paper93 is capable of reasonable estimation, the claim
against the principal debtor can also be estimated. Liability turns pri-
marily on the same factors: the financial status of the principal debtor
and his ability to repay.
Under the cancellation provisions of an NDSL, the student is the
principal debtor and the United States is the guarantor. The contin-
gency, however, is not the ability of the principal debtor to repay, but
rather the possibility that he will die, become disabled, or decide to
teach in specified schools or to specified students.94 Wilkes recognized
the obligation was contingent. Id. at 176. "However, at any particular time the amount of the
debt is known... Thus, the claim is liquidated when a bill is rendered, even if it is subject to
increase. This is not a mere 'arbitrary' estimate. .. , but rather an accurate statement of the
debt at that time." Id. (citation omitted). The court explained that the amount at which the
bankruptcy court would liquidate the debt (at the cost already fixed, the maximum amount possi-
ble, or at an intermediate amount) would depend on the evidence before it indicating the possibil-
ity of an increase such as "the source of any possible windfall [or] the Commissioner's practice if
the bankrupt's wages merely increase." Id. at 177.
86. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
87. 283 U.S. at 278.
88. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 606 (1937) (citation omitted).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1978).
90. 3 COLLmER ON BNKRurpTcY 57.15 (14th ed. 1976).
91. Id.
92. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Dobie, 40 N.Y.2d 712, 358 N.E.2d 502, 389 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1976).
93. Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. at 278.
94. The conditions under which liability on NDSLs may be reduced or cancelled are ex-
tremely limited. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a) (1976). NDSLs granted since 1972 no longer allow a
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that the contingency of death or disability can be reasonably esti-
mated.95 Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that it could also
estimate the likelihood that a student borrower may become a teacher
within several years after the bankruptcy hearing. The court could
have based this estimate on a review of all the pertinent facts, e.g, the
kind of college degree the bankrupt held, his employment status, the
likelihood of his returning to school to obtain a teaching degree, and
his future plans.96 Wilkes affects not only those NDSL borrowers97
with the ability to repay but also those in real need of relief. This result
is not warranted by prior law and is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy
Act's basic purpose to provide a fresh start.98
In any event, in all states except New York there are currently no
direct limitations on the discharge of NDSLs.99 Any person who has
liabilities exceeding assets may obtain a discharge. In Girardier v.
Webster College,"o° however, the Eighth Circuit placed an indirect lim-
itation on the use of bankruptcy to discharge an educational debt. By
allowing private colleges to undertake coercive post-discharge collec-
tion efforts, the court limited the utility of a discharge. But a federal
district court, in Handsome v. Rutgers University,'°' prohibited state
colleges from engaging in such post-discharge conduct.
10% reduction for each year the debtor teaches in a public elementary or secondary school. Id.
They are still cancelled in the event of total disability or death. Id § 1087dd(c)(1)(f). A percent-
age of the loan is cancellable for each year of service as: (1) a ful-time teacher in a public elemen-
tary school that is eligible for assistance pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1964, id. § 241, (2) a full-time staff member in a preschool program carried on
under § 222(a)(1) of the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(1) (1976), (3) a full-time
teacher of handicapped children in a public or other nonprofit elementary or secondary school,
and (4) a member of the United States Armed Forces for service that qualifies for special pay
under 37 U.S.C. § 310 (1976). 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a) (1976).
95. 41 N.Y.2d at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 851. Accord, Dunbar v. Dunbar,
190 U.S. 340, 345 (1903); Reid v. Karoley, 232 Ark. 261, 264, 337 S.W.2d 648, 650 (1960).
96. The probability of the occurrence of other conditions under which part of an NDSL may
be cancelled, supra note 94, are also capable of estimation at the time of the bankruptcy hearing
by considering similar factors.
97. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a) (1976). Wilkes will not affect bankrupts holding GSLs be-
cause the only contingency attached to GSLs is cancellation in the event of death or disability, id.
j 1087(a), and the court acknowledged that this contingency can be reasonably estimated. 41
N.Y.2d at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 558, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
98. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
99. Section 127(a) of the Education Amendments of 1976, 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976),
places limitations only on the discharge of GSLs. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
100. 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
101. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
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After receiving bachelors degrees from Webster College, both plain-
tiffs in Gfrardier obtained bankruptcy discharges of their NDSL indebt-
edness to defendant. The college refused plaintiffs' subsequent request
for transcripts because they had not repaid their NDSLs.10 2  The
Eighth Circuit, while recognizing that the Bankruptcy Act imposes
some limits on creditors' actions, held the Act did not prohibit a private
college from withholding the transcripts of former students whose loans
had been discharged in bankruptcy. 10 3 Section 14(f)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 104 said the court, prohibited only legal means of debt col-
lection and did not prevent creditors from using informal, extralegal
means of inducing the bankrupt to pay his debt.' In Perez v.
CamFbell,1° the Supreme Court prohibited state action that had the
effect of creating "a powerful weapon for collection of a debt."'' 0 7
Girardier, however, interpreted Perez as not precluding the same kinds
of-actions by private creditors.' Although one of the fundamental
policies of the Bankruptcy Act is to provide the debtor with a fresh
start, the majority found that it "does not necessarily mean every con-
ceivable mechanism for furthering this goal has been written into the
Act so as to become law."'10 9
Plaintiff in Handsome v. Rutgers University" attended Rutgers,
102. 563 F.2d at 1269. Plaintiff Girardier owed $1,500 and plaintiff Luzkow owed $1,900.
103. Id. at 1276. The court also held that the "Buckley/Pell Amendment," 20 U.S.C. §
1232(g) (1976), granting students a right to review educational records, did not prohibit Webster
College's refusal Id. at 1276-77.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976).
105. 563 F.2d at 1272-73. The court found that the legislative history did not indicate a con-
gressional intent to include informal means of debt collection within the proscription of § 14(0(2)
and that the word "process" as used within § 14(0(2) implied court action only. Id.
106. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
107. Id. at 650 (quoting Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 183 (1962)).
108. Id. at 1273-74. See Note, Supremacy of the Bankruptcy Act: The New Standard of Perez
v. Campbell, 40 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 764, 771-73 (1972). The court cited cases decided after
Perez involving state or local laws that specifically recognized the private action versus state
action distinction. 563 F.2d at 1273-74. See Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277
(W.D. La. 1975); Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974); In re
Lofkin, 327 So. 2d 543 (La. Ct. App. 1976). The concurring judge in Girardier asserted the pri-
vate action versus state action distinction was not warranted by Perez and said that inconsistent
results may follow from its use. 563 F.2d at 1277 (Bright, J., concurring).
109. 563 F.2d at 1274-75. The court referred to two sections of the proposed Bankruptcy Act
amendments: § 4-508, which would protect a bankrupt from discriminatory treatment, and § 4-
507, which would prohibit the revival or reaffirmation of a debt extinguished by discharge, H.R.
31 & 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4-507, 4-508 (1976), to illustrate the present Bankruptcy Act's
failure to fully implement the fresh start policy. 563 F.2d at 1275-76.
110. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
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which is the New Jersey state university, from 1968 until her poor phys-
ical condition forced her to withdraw in 1975."' Because of her medi-
cal expenses, she was unable to repay her $4,600 NDSL and, therefore,
in April 1977 filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted in June
of that year. 1 2 Thereafter, she applied for readmission,' 1 3 but the uni-
versity refused to allow her to register and refused to supply a copy of
her transcript." 4 The court held that "such thinly-veiled coercion on
the part of a state university to compel repayment of loans duly dis-
charged under the federal bankruptcy laws violates the Supremacy
Clause and plaintiffs right to equal protection as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."'"I5 Because Rutgers, a state creditor, "trans-
gressed upon the 'fresh start' policies of the Bankruptcy Act" by with-
holding plaintiff's transcripts and refusing to allow her to register, its
action violated the supremacy clause." 6 In addition, the court found
that the state had no legitimate interest in securing the repayment of
loans discharged in bankruptcy and that defendant's action violated
plaintiffs fourteenth amendment equal protection rights.1 17
The result in Girardier, although it appears unjust to the plaintiffs in
light of Rutgers, is a correct application of the Bankruptcy Act. In the
1970 amendments, Congress specified the means to prevent abuse of
the discharge process by creditors."' Section 14(f)(2) 119 provides that
the order of discharge shall "enjoin all creditors whose debts are dis-
charged from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or employ-
ing any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the
bankrupt." The Girardier court's holding-that this section prohibits
only legal means of post-discharge debt collection-is supported by
the legislative history of the amendment,120 by Rutgers, 2 ' and by a
111. .d. at 1363-64.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1364.
114. Id. The university's refusal to supply a transcript also thwarted her efforts to apply for
admission to a vocational training program. Id.
115. Id. at 1363.
116. Id. at 1367.
117. Id.
118. Bankruptcy Act, § 14(0, 11 U.S.C. § 32(f) (1976). "Mhe major purpose of the proposed
legislation is to effectuate more fully the discharge in bankruptcy by rendering it less subject to
abuse by harassing creditors." H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4156, 4156.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1976).
120. See H.R. REp. No. 1502, supra note 118; Explanatory Memorandum to Accompany S.
4247, 116 CONG. REc. 34818, 34819 (1970).
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recent federal district court opinion,'2 2 which found that a creditor who
made threats and undertook extralegal collection activities could not be
held in contempt of a Bankruptcy Court's discharge order. 123
In Perez v. Camfpbell, 24 the Supreme Court held that an Arizona
motor vehicle safety act had the purpose and effect of frustrating the
Bankruptcy Act and was therefore invalid under the supremacy
clause. 125  The Arizona statute effectively withheld driving privileges
until a motorist satisfied any automobile accident judgment rendered
against him, even if the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy. 26
The Court found that the "plain and inevitable effect" of this statute
was "to create a powerful weapon for collection of a debt from which
[the] bankrupt [had] been released,"' 27 and that the statute, therefore,
frustrated the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, to give debtors "a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."'128 In short,
the court held that the supremacy clause prohibits coercive state action
to induce payment of a discharged debt.129
The Rutgers court recognized that a college's refusal to grant tran-
scripts to former students whose NDSLs have been discharged in bank-
ruptcy imposes severe consequences upon the student. 30  Unless
students repay their discharged NDSLs, they will be foreclosed from
advancement in education or in livelihoods that require an academic
transcript. This frustrates the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
Therefore, if Webster were a state college, its action would certainly
have been prohibited under the supremacy clause.13' Since Webster is
121. The New Jersey District Court found that the sole purpose of § 14(0(2) "is to prevent
creditors from taking legal actions against debtors." 445 F. Supp. at 1368 (emphasis in original).
122. In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
123. Id. at 996. Although the plaintiffs in Girardier did not so argue, Webster College's asser-
tion of the plaintiffs' failure to pay their NDSLs in defense to plaintiffs' claims could be inter-
preted as a use of "process"e under § 14(0(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Courts would probably be
unwilling to accept this argument, however, since it would be an indirect method of using §
14(0(2) to prevent extralegal actions by creditors, which was not the intended purpose of this
section. See note 120 surpra and accompanying text.
124. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
125. Id. at 652-54.
126. Id. at 639-43.
127. Id. at 649 (quoting Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 183 (1962)).
128. Id. at 648-49 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
129. Id. at 656.
130. 445 F. Supp. at 1363.
131. See id. at 1367.
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a private college, the Girardier result is not inconsistent with Rutgers.
This conclusion, however, is not forced by precedent; no court has pre-
viously held that extralegal actions taken by private creditors against
bankrupts are valid.132 It is instead supported by existing constitu-
tional and statutory law. The Bankruptcy Act does not expressly pro-
hibit discriminatory action by private creditors against bankrupts, and
there is no constitutional or statutory provision that provides a remedy
against a private creditor whose actions violate the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act.' 3
3
There are two possible arguments that plaintiffs could have used to
circumvent the conclusion reached in Girardier. First, plaintiffs could
have argued that the National Defense Education Act13 4 directed Web-
ster College to collect NDSLs for the federal government. 35  This
132. Although the majority opinion in (irardier quoted from a commentary that indicated
there are two cases, Carter v. Sutton, 147 Ga. 496, 94 S.E. 760 (1917), and McClendon v. Kenin,
235 Ore. 588, 590-92, 385 P.2d 615, 616-17 (1963), so holding, neither case, in fact, decided this.
563 F.2d at 1273 (quoting Note, supra note 108, at 722). In Carter, the court upheld the eviction
of a tenant for nonpayment of rent, even though the rent obligation had been discharged in bank-
ruptcy, solely on the basis of a state statute. Further, Carter involved the validity of state action
rather than private action. In McClendon, the court held that a labor organization's suspension of
a member whose debts had been discharged in bankruptcy did not conflict with the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act. "We have here, instead of an exercise of state police power, an exercise of the
right of private persons to contract and associate." 235 Ore. at 591, 385 P.2d at 616. It proceeded
to hold that if state financial responsibility laws do not subvert the purpose of the bankruptcy law,
then the labor organization's action would not subvert it. Id. at 591-92, 385 P.2d at 616. The
court applied the same principles to private and state action to determine whether the action was
prohibited by the Bankruptcy Act. Because Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153
(1962), the state action case upon which MeClendon relied, has been overruled by Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), a court now considering the same kind of action by a labor organization
would have to apply the test set out in Perez, id. at 648-50, to determine if the action is prohibited.
Since 1971, when Perez was decided, only one court has discussed whether extralegal action by
private parties against a bankrupt is contrary to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The court's statement that
the Bankruptcy Act does not shield a bankrupt from actions taken by private individuals, id. at
929-30, is dictum. Id. at 934.
133. Although the Rutgers court disagreed with the result reached in Girardier and suggested
that "a student has some sort of a property interest in his transcripts, which reflect time, money
and hard work," the court indicated no constitutional provision or statute under which the plain-
tiffs in Girardier could have enforced this property right. 445 F. Supp. at 1366 n.6. Indeed, the
Rutgers court acknowledged that "it is the state--and not private parties-which is limited by the
Supremacy Clause," and that the fourteenth amendment applies only to state actions. Id. at 1367.
134. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087cc(a)(2XC), 1087cc(a)(2)(D), 1087cc(a)(3)(D), 1087cc(a)(5), 1087dd
(cXl)(H) (1976).
135. See 45 C.F.R. § 144.11(c) (1976), which reads in pertinent part:
Each institution at which a Fund is established shall accept responsibility for and use
due diligence in effecting collection of all amounts due and payable to the Fund in con-
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would establish a conflict between two federal statutes, the Bankruptcy
Act and the National Defense Education Act. In Zwick v. Freeman 136
and Marvin Tragash Co. v. United States Department of Agriculture,137
courts were faced with similar situations. In these cases the conflict
was between section 2 of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act, 138 which imposes penalties upon members of the industry for
flagrant and repeated failure to pay debts, and the Bankruptcy Act.
Although both courts upheld the penalty provision of the Commodities
Act, 139 the decisions set forth the applicable test when two federal stat-
utes conflict: If the extent of the encroachment of one federal statute
upon the goals of the other is "unconscionable, excessive, or irreconcil-
able,'110 the encroaching provision is invalid. To use this argument
successfully a plaintiff would have to prove that the goal of the collec-
tion provision of the National Defense Education Act is to require
schools to coerce payment of a discharged NDSL and that this goal
unconscionably or irreconcilably conflicts with the fresh start purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act.'
The plaintiffs also could have argued that Webster College violated
section 1985(3)142 by withholding transcripts. Although the Supreme
nection with loan transactions of the Fund. The institution shall use such collection
practices as are generally accepted among institutions of higher education and which are
at least as extensive and forceful as those used in the collection of other student loan
accounts due the institution. In the exercise of due diligence, the institution shall:...
(4) Establish such further collection procedures as the institution may consider appropri-
ate to effect prompt and regular repayments.
136. 373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967).
137. 524 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1975).
138. 7 U.S.C. § 499(b) (1976).
139. 524 F.2d at 1256; 373 F.2d at 117. The Zwick court explained:
The measures which petitioners object to in the Commodities Act... prevent peti-
tioners from shortly making a fresh debt-free start in the industry in which they had been
earning their livelihood, although they are entirely free, as far as the challenged statute is
concerned, to enter any other occupation or business which appeals to them. Neverthe-
less, in the light of the purposes of the Commodities Act. . .to have financially respon-
sible persons as licensees or employees of licensees under that Act, the extent of
encroachment of the Commodities Act upon the goals of the Bankruptcy Act cannot be
regarded as unconscionable or excessive.
373 F.2d at 116-17.
140. 524 F.2d at 1258; 373 F.2d at 116-17.
141. 20 U.S.C. § 425(b) & (c) (1976). See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text. The
Zwick court noted that the Commodities Act provision does not prevent persons from making a
fresh start in any occupation other than the perishable agricultural commodities industry, see note
139 su.pra, whereas the collection provision of the National Defense Education Act in effect pre-
vents persons from making a fresh start in any business that requires further education or a tran-
script in order to obtain a job.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), which provides:
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Court held in Grfin v. Breckenridge'43 that section 1985(3) applies to a
purely private conspiracy that deprives plaintiffs of their thirteenth
amendment rights, lower courts have taken inconsistent positions on
whether it reaches private conspiracies that deprive plaintiffs of four-
teenth amendment rights.'" If plaintiff is in a jurisdiction that has
held section 1985(3) prohibits the deprivation of fourteenth amend-
ment rights by private conspiracies, he must allege that the purpose of
the conspiracy was to deprive him of equal protection of the laws or
equal privileges and immunities under the laws, that racial or class-
based discrimination motivated the conspirators, and that he suffered
injury to his person or property or was deprived of his constitutional
rights.'45 Although the third element was present in Girardier, it
would be difficult to argue the presence of the first two.
Several lower courts have held that a university cannot conspire with
itself. 46 "[I]f the challenged conduct is essentially a single act of dis-
crimination by a single business entity, the fact that two or more agents
participated in the decision or in the act itself will normally not consti-
tute the conspiracy contemplated by [section 1985(3)]." 147 It is possible
to argue, however, that this single entity rule is inapposite in bank-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; [and] in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
143. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
144. See Note, Section 1985(3): A Viable Alternative to Title V11for Sex-Based Employment
Discrimination, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 367. Alternatively, a plaintiff could argue that because a
private university receives federal funding and helps to meet federal policy goals through its
participation in the student loan programs, its private collection efforts are state action.
145. See Note, supra note 144, at 383-86. Accord, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03
(1971).
146. Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (M.D. Pa. 1976). Accord,
Rubenstein v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Cole v.
University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 894 (D. Conn. 1975). An exception to this rule is found
in Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974), where the court recog-
nized a conspiracy among the university, its officers, and certain tenured faculty members because
of continuing and varied instances of discrimination and harassment. Accord, Weise v. Syracuse
Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975).
147. Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). Accord, Girard v. 94th St. &
Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66,70 (2d Cir. 1976); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp.
1264, 1276 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1397, 1402
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1975); Rack-
in v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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ruptcy discrimination cases.1 48
If the burden of proving a conspiracy between two or more persons is
met, the only remaining problem is to prove the second element: intent
to deprive a person of equal protection or equal privileges and immuni-
ties. This element is satisfied by proving "some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action." 149  Plaintiffs must allege, therefore, that they be-
long to a class consisting of student borrowers seeking to obtain the
shelter of the bankruptcy laws and that the private college's actions
were directed at plaintiffs because of their membership in this class
rather than because of their individual traits. Then plaintiffs must
prove that their class is one of those protected by section 1985(3). The
Fifth Circuit sitting en banc in McLellan v. Mississiopi Power & Light
Co. 15° recently held that because no statutory protection against dis-
criminatory treatment has ever been afforded bankrupts and because
the Supreme Court has decided the right to file in bankruptcy is not a
fundamental right,151 section 1985(3) does not protect bankrupts as a
class. 52 However, the Court has not held the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of sex to be a fundamental right; yet several
lower courts have held that sex discrimination activates section
148. See Note, supra note 144, at 386-89 (arguing the single entity rule should be confined to
antitrust cases and is inapposite in sex-based employment discrimination cases).
149. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Accord, McLellan v. Mississippi Power
& Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), vacating 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976);
Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206,210 (5th Cir. 1975) (participation in environmental
activities raised a sufficient inference of" 'class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the alleged actions of the conspirators' to evidence subject matter jurisdiction ... under §
1985(3)"); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (§ 1985(3)'s "protection reaches clearly
defined classes such as supporters of a political candidate"); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th
Cir. 1971) (upholding a § 1985(3) claim by white church members alleging deprivation of first
amendment rights); Grill v. Seilaff, 414 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Il1. 1976); Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F.
Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (private conspiracy motivated by invidious discriminatory intent
based upon sex is sufficiently class-based); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (plaintiff who alleged "she was discriminated against for her advocacy of women's rights
. . . has satisfied the class-based animus requirement").
150. 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), vacating 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976). McLellan
involved an employee who was discharged from private employment solely because he filed a
petition in voluntary bankruptcy. Id. at 922. The employee alleged a conspiracy between his
employer and his union, which had refused to assist him in seeking reinstatement. Id.
151. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
152. 545 F.2d at 932-33. The court devoted much of its opinion to elaborating the theory that
to establish liability under § 1985(3) one must show the conspirators' intentional conduct to be
independently violative of state law. Id. at 924-27, 929-31. The court resolved the case, however,
by holding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the class-based animus requirement. The enunciation
of its independent illegality test was therefore dictum.
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1985(3).53 As the dissenting judge in McLellan said: "[T]he problem
...involves ascertaining the strength and scope of the federal policy
of solicitude for bankrupts or potential bankrupts." 154 The panel opin-
ion, which had held that bankrupts were a protected class under section
1985(3), 155 based its decision on "[t]he legislative intent to assist eco-
nomically troubled individuals and the long line of federal cases reaf-
firming that goal." 156  The determination of the class status of
bankrupts is complex and should be presented for further consideration
by other courts.
The judicial responses to the increasing number of student loan
bankruptcies, at worst, make irrational distinctions and, at best, offer
only a partial solution to the problem. The decision in State v.
Wilkes1 57 was erroneous; the court's construction of section 57(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act15 1 was inconsistent with both the prior case law and
the fresh start purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. The result of the
Girardier59 and Rutgers"6 decisions is that bankrupts who have ob-
tained a discharge of student loans will be treated differently depending
on whether they attended a state or private university. Wilkes, even if
followed by other courts, would only prevent the discharge of NDSLs.
It would not prohibit the discharge of GSLs. The Girardier holding
will have a deterrent effect only on those students who have attended
private universities and foresee a need for future services from the uni-
versity. Unfortunately, both decisions treat students who are abusing
the bankruptcy process in the same manner as those students in real
need of a discharge.
V. EVALUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
There are several possible legislative responses to the problem of stu-
dent loan bankruptcies. First, Congress could tighten the operation of
the loan programs, especially the eligibility requirements and the col-
loetion mechanism, while leaving student loans freely dischargeable in
153. E.g., Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Reichart v.
Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
154. 545 F.2d at 939.
155. 526 F.2d at 877-78.
156. Id. at 878.
157. 41 N.Y.2d 655, 363 N.E.2d 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1977).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1976).
159. 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
160. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.NJ. 1978).
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bankruptcy. 161  Second, Congress could prohibit the discharge of all
student loans in the first five years of the repayment period unless the
debtor could prove undue hardship. 62  Third, Congress could prohibit
the discharge of all educational loans only during the first five years of
the repayment period, provided the creditor can prove the debtor will
not suffer undue hardship. 163  Finally, discharge of educational debts
could be prohibited entirely."
To date, there have been four legislative responses. The first two,
however, conflict with the last two. The Education Amendments of
1976165 and the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws' 1976 proposed
amendments 66 both placed limits on the dischargeability of educa-
tional loans. The latter two responses,167 both made in 1977, would
repeal the Education Amendments provision and allow all educational
debts to be freely dischargeable.
The House Report accompanying H.R. 8200168 included several ar-
guments favoring the repeal of the Education Amendments of 1976.
Several witnesses argued that section 127(a) deprives students of "a
right which every other citizen has available to him if he needs it,' 69
and by its presumption of abuse treats all students as though they were
suspected felons.170 This section is "grossly unfair to the solid majority
of honest and good faith debtors,"'' because it requires them to prove
"undue hardship," which may be a difficult standard to meet.' 72
Moreover, this is not justified by need or policy.173 Statistics reveal
that only one-half to three-fourths of one percent of all matured loans
161. See H.R. 8457, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); notes
56-58 supra and accompanying text.
162. This response is similar to § 127(a) of the Education Aihendments of 1976, but it includes
all student loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976). See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
163. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States made this proposal. See
note 49 supra and accompanying text.
164. This response was proposed in H.R. 6428, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
165. Education Amendments of 1976, § 127(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976). See note 48
4upra and accompanying text.
166. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4-506(a)(8) (1976), reprinted in Bankruptcy Act Hearings,
supra note 1, app. 156-57. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
167. H.R. 8457, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See
notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
168. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
169. Id. at 149, 154.
170. Id. at 149, 151, 154, 161.
171. Id. at 155.
172. Id. at 154-55.
173. Id. at 134, 152, 154, 155, 160.
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are discharged in bankruptcy'74 and that only a small portion, perhaps
twenty percent, of these bankruptcy cases involved abuse.175 Rather
than limiting the bankruptcy process, the loan program, especially the
eligibility requirements and collection efforts, could be tightened,176 or,
if that alternative is unacceptable, the losses incurred by the loan pro-
grams should be viewed as the cost of necessary social legislation. 177 In
addition, section 127(a) is contrary to the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act to provide a fresh start to debtors 78 and to provide equal treatment
for all creditors. 179
Those who propose limiting the discharge of educational loans rely
on the following justifications. Although student loans represent only
a small percentage of all matured loans, the number of bankruptcies
and the dollar amount of loss is significant in absolute terms.'80 From
1970 through 1975 approximately $30 million of student loans were
discharged in bankruptcy.' 81 Further, as efforts to collect all the stu-
dent loans in default'82 are increased,' 83 there will probably be a
greater increase in the number of bankruptcies. 84 Even if the increase
in student loan bankruptcies is not due solely to increased abuse and is
not threatening to destroy the loan system, policy reasons dictate limit-
ing whatever abuse exists. Educational loans, in contrast to consumer
loans, are extended on a good faith, nonprofit basis'85 at low interest
174. Id. at 133, 148, 152. This percentage does not appear to represent any threat to the loan
program. Id. at 151. "Student bankruptcy is only growing at a larger percentage rate than other
bankruptcy because it has only been in the past several years that there has been any substantial
number of educational loans coming into maturity." Id. at 149.
175. Id. at 133, 154-55, 161-62. The 20% figure is derived from the GAO study, see notes 53-
54 supra and accompanying text, which found that in 20% of the bankruptcy cases involving
guaranteed student loans, over 80% of the debtor's total indebtedness arose from educational
loans. Id. at 133. If a debtor's student loans were less than 80% of his total debts, it is likely he
-encountered financial difficulty after school, and that the bankruptcy is a result of a true need for
bankruptcy relief rather than an abuse of the bankruptcy system." Id.
176. id. at 134, 154, 160.
177. Id. at 134.
178. Id. at 133-34, 152-53. The report notes that a student loan is not "a fundamentally dif-
ferent type of obligation from that involving loans for 'material' reasons." d. at 153.
179. Id. at 134, 151-52, 155, 162.
180. Higher Education Hearings, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of T.H. Bell).
181. BankruptcyAct Hearings, supra note 1, at 1076 (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.); Letter
from Robert Coates, supra note 36.
182. The default rate on guaranteed student loans is approximately 18-22%. Bankruptcy Act
Hearings, supra note 1, at 1090 (statement of John N. Erlenboru).
183. See St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Oct. 26, 1977, at 9A, col. 4.
184. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
618 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rates to borrowers who have neither collateral nor co-signors. 186 A stu-
dent loan is also distinguishable from medical bills and other debts in-
curred as a result of accident or misfortune because the discharge of a
student loan not only puts the student back on his feet but in many
cases also gives him a head start. Finally, allowing discharge of the
loans of students who have the ability to repay is contrary to the policy
behind the student loan programs not to provide outright grants to stu-
dents seeking higher education."8 7
The best legislative response to the problem would be to enact a law
prohibiting discharge of any GSLs or NDSLs in the first five years of
its repayment period if the creditor can prove the debtor would not
suffer undue hardship.188 Congress should also prohibit educational
institutions from engaging in any discriminatory conduct that has the
effect of coercing repayment of discharged loans. The statute should
also include a method to determine whether a denial of discharge
would impose an undue hardship on a debtor. The Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws proposed the following test:
[T]he rate and amount of his future resources should be estimated reason-
ably in terms of ability to obtain, retain, and continue employment and
the rate of pay that can be expected. Any unearned income or other
wealth which the debtor can be expected to receive should also be taken
into account. The total amount of income, its reliability, and the perio-
dicity of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor and his
dependents, at a minimal standard of living within their management ca-
pability, as well as to pay their educational debt. 189
This test would prevent discharge of student loans in the two situations
where the debtor does not need a fresh start: (1) where the student cur-
Consider the immediate moral response to the situation in which a loan is made by a
friend as against the loan taken from a bank with assets of hundreds of million dol-
lars.... [W]hat are the salient differences that seem to create similar legal obligations
but of different morality?
... Is it not that one creditor is in the business of making loans for profit, and that
there is nothing philanthropic about the obligation? Do we not take into account that
the debt was created as part of a calculated impersonal undertaking involving large num-
bers of similar "investments" all made for profit?
Schuchman, supra note 27, at 428-29.
186. See Higher Education Hearings, supra note 11, at 190-91 (statement of Charles Meares);
Bankruptcy Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 1068 (statement of Ray Thornton).
187. If Congress had intended to relieve students of responsibility for the costs of higher edu-
cation, it could have done so. Instead, this alternative was expressly rejected in favor of providing
loans on a good faith basis to students. S. REP. No. 673, supra note 16, at 4060.
188. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
189. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 18, Part II, at 140-41. This proposal was contained in the
notes to H.R. 31, supra note 49, § 4-506, but was not included in the amendment.
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rently has the ability to repay his debt;190 and (2) where the student has
received such benefits from his higher education that a discharge of his
debt would give him a head start.191
Congress has the constitutional power to enact such a statute. The
only possible constitutional challenge might be that the statute violates
the equal protection guarantee by setting up a special class of student
borrowers.1 92 Because bankruptcy is not a fundamental right, the stat-
ute, to withstand this challenge, must have a rational justification 93
such as prevention of abuse.
The statistics indicate that some limitation should be placed on the
dischargeability of student loans in order to minimize abuse. Al-
though the GAO study indicates that approximately twenty percent of
student loan bankruptcies are attributable to persons abusing the bank-
ruptcy process,194 in absolute terms this represents a significant loss.
As collection efforts increase, many debtors whose loans are now in
default will seek a bankruptcy discharge, 95 thereby increasing the
losses in both loan programs. Because both programs suffer approxi-
mately the same percentage of loss from loans discharged in bank-
ruptcy, 96 the same limitations should apply to each.
Limiting the discharge of student loans when there is abuse 97 is con-
sistent with the fresh start purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. When an
individual has acquired skills from his education that have value in the
marketplace there is no need for his loan to be cancelled. The liability
190. This situation arises when a former student petitions for bankruptcy while his assets are
less than his liabilities, but he has sufficient income to make periodic payments on his loan.
191. This category includes former students who, as a result of their educational loan, have
obtained a skill or trade that is beneficial to them in the marketplace. A student is in the first
category but not in the second category if his income resulted from some factor other than his
education, eg., an unexpected inheritance. A person would be included in the second category
and not in the first when he had no income actually coming in at the time he fied for bankruptcy,
but as a result of his education his prospects for obtaining sufficient future income were strong,
eg., the social work major who graduates at a time when there is a strong demand for social
workers, but files for bankruptcy before he obtains a job.
192. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), was the first case to recognize that the equal
protection guarantee is part of the due process assurance of the fifth amendment.
193. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,446 (1973). The Court held that bankruptcy is not a
fundamental right and that it does not touch upon any suspect criteria. Id. at 446. "Instead,
bankruptcy legislation is in the area of economics and social welfare.... This being so, the
applicable standard, in measuring the propriety of Congress' classification, is that of rational
justification." Id.
194. See note 175 supra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 182-84 supra and accompanying text.
196. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
197. See note 191 supra and accompanying text
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for his educational debt is offset by the asset he has acquired. If, how-
ever, the debt were to be cancelled, the former student would retain a
valuable asset giving him a head start over those who do not have a
similar education.'9"
Limiting the dischargeability of educational loans is also consistent
with the purposes of the student loan programs. Congress intended
that the program ensure a supply of competent professional and techni-
cal personnel' 99 and provide financial aid to students otherwise unable
to pursue an education.0 Congress chose to achieve these goals by
implementing an accessible and massive loan system, not by furnishing
outright grants to students.201 To allow students who could repay their
debt if they so desired to discharge their loans in bankruptcy is contrary
to the federal government's intention to extend loans on a good faith,
nonprofit basis.2"2
The need for legislative action in this area is underscored by the irra-
tional and incomplete solution provided by the courts.20 3 Given the
GAO study, which indicates that a minority of student loan bankrupt-
cies are due to abuse, °4 there is no reason for a blanket prohibition of
the discharge of NDSLs. °5 If Congress were to enact a provision lim-
iting discharge to those student debtors truly in need of a fresh start,
there would be no justification for permitting private universities to un-
dertake coercive actions.2 6  These practices frustrate the fresh start
policy of the Bankruptcy Act,207 and irrationally prohibit only state
universities from engaging in this conduct.
Placing the burden on creditors to prove that the debtor will not suf-
fer undue hardship eliminates several objections208 to section 127(a).20 9
The suggested statute presumes the good faith rather than the dishon-
198. The debtor would also have a head start over those with a similar education who have an
accompanying liability for a student loan. Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Act to pro-
vide a head start. See Richardson v. United States, 552 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Kokoszka,
479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973), afl'dsub. nom. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
199. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
200. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
201. See note 187 supra.
202. Note that most of the loss from student loan bankruptcies is borne by the federal govern-
ment. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
203. See notes 157-60 supra and accompanying text.
204. See notes 53-54, & 194 supra and accompanying text.
205. State v. Wilkes, 41 N.Y.2d 655, 363 N.E.2d 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1977).
206. Girardier v. Webster College; 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
207. See notes 129-31 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 169-72 supra and accompanying text.
209. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3(a) (1976).
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esty of the student debtor.21° By treating an educational loan as prima
facie dischargeable and by placing the burden on the creditor to prove
the loan is excepted from discharge, the statute treats student loans in
the same manner as other debts.2 ' Moreover, this allocation of the
burden of proof avoids creating "an undue hardship for good faith
bankrupts. ' 21 2  Good faith student bankrupts will also be protected by
bankruptcy courts, which tend to construe reasonable exceptions to dis-
charge in favor of the bankrupt.
1 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The best alternative is to impose some limitations on the discharge of
educational loans rather than merely tightening the programs and leav-
ing student loans freely dischargeable. Reducing eligibility by requir-
ing cosignors or collateral is contrary to the purposes of the loan
programs, and increasing collection efforts on loans in default will lead
to an increase in bankruptcies, thereby further increasing the need for
limitations on discharge. The large volume of student loan bankrupt-
cies and the Bankruptcy Act's policies justify the exception, in certain
circumstances, of these loans from discharge. The courts have not ra-
tionally delineated the appropriate circumstances; therefore the solu-
tion lies with Congress.
Mala Gusman Bridwell
As this Note went to press, Congress repealed section 127 of the Education
Amendments of 1976 and added educational loans to the list of exceptions
from discharge.
210. This is consistent with the GAO study, which indicates that only a minority of bankrupt-
ies involving educational loans are due to abuse. See notes 53-54, 175, & 194 supra.
211. Courts have consistently held that all provable debts are prima fade dischargeable and
that the creditor has the burden of proving a debt is within the exceptions to discharge listed in §
17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, I1 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976). See, e.g., Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 595
(1923); In re Knight, 421 F. Supp. 1387 (M.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977); In re
Dolnick, 374 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. IM. 1974); Sweet v. Ritter Fin. Co., 263 F. Supp. 540 (W.D. Va.
1%7); Anderson v. Sundstrom, 307 Minn. 439, 241 N.W. 2d 82 (1976); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Lauerman, 12 Wis. 2d 387, 107 N.W.2d 605 (1961).
212. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 53, at 135. Although it may be difficult for a creditor to
prove that the debtor will not suffer undue hardship if forced to repay his loan, it is unfair to place
the burden on the debtor when the GAO study indicates that only a minority of student loan
bankruptcies involve abuse. In any event, it often will not be a difficult burden for the creditor.
The debtor's schedule of assets and debts and a sworn statement from the debtor about his current
income, future job prospects, and expected future income may be sufficient to prove the debtor has
the ability to repay without suffering undue hardship.
213. See Gross v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 302 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1962); In re Fuhrman, 385 F.
Supp. 1185 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Soika, 365 F. Supp. 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
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